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THE SHURTLEFF CONUNDRUM:
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN
GOVERNMENT-SPEECH AND
PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS
JAMES WALRAVEN*

INTRODUCTION
Shurtleff v. Boston is the Supreme Court’s latest opportunity to
clarify the murky line between the government-speech doctrine and
public forum analysis. Although the public forum doctrine provides
varying degrees of protection from government censorship,1 the
government-speech doctrine provides the State with near-complete
immunity from Free Speech Clause scrutiny when the government
speaks for itself.2 In Shurtleff, the Court will decide whether the City of
Boston’s refusal to fly a private organization’s Christian flag on
Boston’s City Hall flagpole merely constitutes the government’s right
to speak for itself3 or was unlawful regulation of private speech. The
Court should add an additional, dispositive prong to the test for
government-speech—requiring sufficient evidence that the
government intends to speak for itself—before it may claim the
government-speech defense. Doing so would add guidance to the
doctrine by resolving the conundrum of distinguishing between
government-speech and public forum analysis in close cases. Creating
an additional requirement would also narrow the circumstances under
which the government may claim the defense, and thereby protect the

*Copyright 2022 @ James Walraven
J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2023. B.A., University of California,
Irvine, 2020. Special thanks to the highly dedicated editors of the Duke Journal of Constitutional
Law & Public Policy. With gratitude for Dad and Bryan Westerfeld.
1. See generally Part II-A, infra (explaining judicial Free Speech Clause scrutiny in the
three types of public forums).
2. Infra, note 61.
3. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (explaining that the “Free
Speech Clause has no application” when the government speaks for itself).
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interests of government accountability and free expression.
I.

FACTS

The City of Boston operates three flag poles in an area outside its
City Hall.4 While two of the flagpoles are typically occupied by other
flags—the United States flag and the Massachusetts flag—the third
flagpole is occupied by the Boston city flag.5 The City will occasionally
replace its own flag with an approved flag of a private organization in
connection with a private event near the flagpoles.6 The City’s website
informs visitors that events on city-owned property near City Hall
require permission from the City, which an interested party can obtain
after submitting an application.7 The application in question stated that
“Management seeks to accommodate all applicants seeking to take
advantage of the City of Boston’s public forums.”8
During the relevant period, Gregory T. Rooney was the
Commissioner of Boston’s Property Management Department.9
Rooney decides whether a proposed flag-raising is “consistent with the
City’s message, policies, and practices.”10 Between 2005 and 2017, the
City approved all 284 flag-raisings on the third flagpole outside City
Hall.11 The approved flags included banners associated with ethnic
celebrations, cultural events, and social causes such as gay pride.12 In
allowing organizations the opportunity to use the city flagpole, the City
sought to “commemorate flags from many countries and
communities,”13 establish “an environment in the City where everyone
feels included, and is treated with respect,” and “foster diversity and
build and strengthen connections among Boston’s many

4. Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 986 F.3d 78, 82 (1st. Cir. 2021)
5. Id.
6. Id. at 82–83.
7. Id. at 83.
8. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Shurtleff v. City of Bos. (U.S. argued Jan. 18, 2021) (No. 201800).
9. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 82.
10. Id. at 83
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 2020 WL 555248 at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 4,
2020), aff'd, 986 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. granted sub nom. Shurtleff v. City of Bos.,
Massachusetts, 142 S. Ct. 55, 210 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (2021) (“Examples of other flags that have been
raised on the third flagpole are country flags, e.g. the flags of Brazil, Ethiopia, Portugal, the
People’s Republic of China and Cuba, and the flags of private organizations, including the
Juneteenth flag recognizing the end of slavery, the LGBT rainbow pride flag, the pink transgender
rights flag, and the Bunker Hill Association flag.”).
13. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 83.
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communities.”14
Shurtleff is the founder of Camp Constitution,15 an organization
whose goals are to “enhance understanding of our [country’s] JudeoChristian moral heritage” by coordinating events “inspiring respect for,
and appreciation of, God, home, and country.”16 In July 2017, Shurtleff
emailed the City requesting permission to fly a “Christian Flag” at City
Hall in connection with Camp Constitution’s proposed event, which
would include speeches by local clergy about Boston’s history.17 The
email included an image of the proposed flag containing a red Latin
cross.18
Although Rooney had never rejected a flag-raising application, he
denied Camp Constitution’s request after reviewing past flag-raising
applications and determining that the City had a practice and policy of
not flying religious flags.19 Rooney explained to Shurtleff that the City
prohibits the flying of non-secular flags in compliance with the First
Amendment’s prohibition on governments from establishing an official
religion,20 and further noted the City’s authority to decide how it
allocates its limited public resources, like the flagpole outside City
Hall.21
Shurtleff and Camp Constitution sued the City of Boston and
Gregory T. Rooney, in his capacity as Commissioner of the City of
Boston Property Management Department, in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.22 Shurtleff sought to
enjoin the City from preventing the display of the plaintiff’s “Christian
14. Shurtleff, 2020 WL 555248 at *2.
15. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 84.
16. Camp Constitution, https://campconstitution.net/mission-statement/ (last visited Feb.
22, 2022).
17. Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 928 F.3d 166, 170 (1st Cir. 2019).
18. Id.
19. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 84. See also id. at 83 (“Each applicant submits a short description
of the flag that it wishes to hoist . . . and it is Rooney’s invariable practice to act upon the flagraising request without seeing the actual flag. The record makes manifest that Rooney has never
sought to look at a flag before approving an application. If Rooney concludes that the event
meets the City’s standards, he then approves the flag-raising event.”); id. at 84 (“Of course, some
of the flags that the City had raised contained religious imagery. . . . [For] example, the Turkish
flag situates a star and crescent of the Islamic Ottoman Empire in white against a red background.
Indeed, the City’s own flag includes a Latin inscription, which translates as ‘God be with us as he
was with our fathers.’”).
20. Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 2020 WL 555248 at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 4, 2020), aff'd, 986 F.3d
78 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. granted sub nom. Shurtleff v. City of Bos., Massachusetts, 142 S. Ct. 55,
210 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (2021).
21. Shurtleff, 928 F.3d at 170.
22. Shurtleff, 2020 WL 555248 at *1.
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flag” on the City Hall flagpole.23 Both parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment on all the plaintiffs’ claims, which included “1) a
violation of the First Amendment free speech clause; 2) a violation of
the First Amendment establishment clause; 3) a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause;”24 and equivalent
violations under the Massachusetts state constitution.25 The district
court held that the flagpole constitutes “government speech” and is
therefore “not subject to First Amendment restrictions.”26 The court
further held that the City violated neither the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment,27 nor the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.28 Accordingly, the district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.29 The plaintiffs appealed
the decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.30
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Shurtleff implicates the protections guaranteed in the First
Amendment, which commands that the government “shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.”31 On the one
hand, public forum analysis represents the judiciary’s declaration of
varying degrees of Free Speech protection for citizens and allowable
conduct by the government, depending on the nature of the medium
where private speech is expressed. On the other hand, the governmentspeech doctrine allows the government to function by providing
absolute immunity from Free Speech Clause scrutiny when the
government is speaking for itself.

23. Id.
24. Id. at *3.
25. See id. (“a violation of the freedom of speech clause of Article 16 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights . . . a violation of the non-establishment of religion clauses of Articles 2
and 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights . . . [and] a violation of equal protection under
Articles 1 and 3 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. . . . [T]he standard for the claims
arising under Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is the same as applies under the U.S.
Constitution. . . .”).
26. Id. at *5.
27. Id.
28. Shurtleff, 2020 WL 555248 at *6.
29. Id.
30. Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 986 F.3d 78, 85 (1st. Cir. 2021).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I; See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(incorporating First Amendment protections through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgement by State actors).
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A. Free Speech in Public Forums
1. The Three Forums for Private Speech
Public forum analysis involves three distinct categories of forums
each arising under different circumstances, and requiring differing, but
often overlapping, constitutional scrutiny. These standards were laid
out in Perry v. Perry,32 in which the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a public school district’s restriction of access to an
interschool mail system violated the First Amendment, where one
union representing the teachers was permitted access, but rival unions
were denied.33 The Court explained that the Free Speech Clause
imposes different rights and obligations on the government, depending
on the character of the forum.34
In the first category, “quintessential public forums,” or “places
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate,” any content-based restriction must survive strict
scrutiny (i.e., be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
end).35 Content-neutral “time, place, and manner” restrictions on
speech need only survive intermediate scrutiny (i.e., serve a significant
government interest and leave open alternative channels of
communication.)36
A second category of public property is a domain that the
government creates by “designation” of a public forum for private
expression.37 Although the government may revoke the open nature of
the facility, as long as it remains open the State is bound by the same
standards governing traditional public forums: “Reasonable time, place
and manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based
prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
interest.”38

32. Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
33. Id. at 39. The representative union and the school district negotiated a collective
bargaining agreement under which the union was granted access to teacher mailboxes for
communication with teachers for union purposes, and prohibited access to all other teachers’
unions. Id. at 40.
34. See id. at 44. (“The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by
which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the
property at issue.”).
35. Id. at 45.
36. Id.
37. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (citing
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 and 46, n. 7 (1983)).
38. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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In the third category, public property that is neither by tradition nor
designation a public forum, the government is freer from First
Amendment constraints and may regulate the speech in the forum in
service of the forum’s intended purpose, so long as the regulation is
reasonable and not out of hostility to the speaker’s viewpoint.39
The Court noted that the school district in Perry might have created
a public forum if “by policy or by practice” it had granted
indiscriminate access to the general public.40 Such was not the case,
however.41 Accordingly, upon finding the forum to be limited or
“nonpublic,” the Court approved of the school district’s preferential
treatment of one union.42 The Court found this preference to be a
reasonable content-based restriction, allowable in the third category of
limited or nonpublic forums.43
2. Government Intent in Public Forum Analysis
The government’s intent is a relevant concern for a court tasked
with deciding which of Perry’s three categories to apply. In Cornelius v.
NAACP,44 decided two years after Perry, the Court expounded on
these principles.45 The Court explained that the government can only
39. See id. (“[The government may] reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”).
40. Id. at 47.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 47–48. Other cases and courts refer to Perry’s third category as “nonpublic,”
“limited,” or “limited public” forums. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (quoting Perry, 460
U.S. at 46) (“Access to a nonpublic forum, however, can be restricted as long as the restrictions
are ‘reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s view.’”); Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 900 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We are
concerned with three types of fora: (1) the traditional forum; (2) the designated public forum; and
(3) the limited forum.”); Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 981 F.3d 489, 496,
n.2 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We will refer to this last category as limited public forums, although in past
cases they’ve sometimes been labeled nonpublic forums. The label doesn’t matter, because the
same level of First Amendment scrutiny applies to all forums that aren’t traditional or designated
public forums.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
43. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 (“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to
make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions
may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting
a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property. The
touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose
which the forum at issue serves.”).
44. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
45. The case involved the legality of the federal government’s exclusion from a charity drive
aimed at federal employees of certain legal and political advocacy organizations. Id. at 790.
Accordingly, the Court needed to “identify the nature of the forum, because the extent to which
the government may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic.” Id. at
797.
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open a nontraditional forum to the public by doing so intentionally.46
Whether it has done so is to be decided in light of the government’s
“policy and practice” with regard to such alleged public forum.47
Relevant to this question of the government’s intent is “the nature of
the property and its compatibility with expressive activity.”48 The Court
proclaimed that it will neither find that the government has created a
public forum absent a clear showing of intent, nor infer such intent
where public expression is inconsistent with the nature of the
property.49 The Court noted an additional relevant concern in
determining the government’s intent: whether there is evidence the
government’s approval of a private party’s participation in a forum is
“merely ministerial.”50
3. Content and Viewpoint Regulation in Forums for Private
Speech
The distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination is
relevant because the former may be regulated according to which Perry
category the forum belongs, while the latter cannot be regulated under
any circumstances. In Rosenberger v. UVA,51 the Court explained that
in general, the government may not regulate speech where the
“ideology or opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for
the restriction.”52 Although a government can confine a forum to
certain speakers or topics in serving its legitimate purpose, it must
respect those lawful boundaries once set.53 Therefore, the Court
explained:
“[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it
has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed
a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other
hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”54

46. Id. at 802.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803 (1985); see also id. at 804 (“In cases where the principal
function of the property would be disrupted by expressive activity, the Court is particularly
reluctant to hold that the government intended to designate a public forum.”).
50. Id. at 804 (citing Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)).
51. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
52. Id. at 829 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 829–30 (1995) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
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More recently, in Matal v. Tam,55 the Court took a broad view of
viewpoint discrimination. The case involved the Patent and Trademark
Office’s (PTO) rejection of trademark registration of the band name
“The Slants,” a derogatory term for Asian people.56 The applicant, an
Asian-American, hoped to perform under the name and thereby “drain
its denigrating force.”57 The PTO denied the application under a
provision that barred federal registration of offensive trademarks.58 The
Court found the provision’s ban on disparaging trademarks to be
unlawful viewpoint discrimination.59 The Court explained: “To be sure,
the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups . . . . But
in the sense relevant here, that is viewpoint discrimination: Giving
offense is a viewpoint.”60
B. The Government-Speech Doctrine
When expression is labeled “government-speech,” the restrictions
on the government in forum analysis are inapplicable, and the
government is entitled to speak as it sees fit.61 Therefore, when the
government purports to assert its own ideas and messages, it can
sometimes cast aside the content-neutrality question entirely and
impose content or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.62
1. The Three-Factor Test for Government Speech
The Court iterated a three-factor test for finding governmentspeech in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.63 There, Pleasant Grove
City, Utah, denied a religious group’s request to erect a stone
55. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
56. Id. at 1751.
57. Id.
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (barring trademark registration of marks that “disparage . . .
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or
disrepute”).
59. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
60. Id.
61. See John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159,
1166 (2015) (explaining that under the “evolving government speech doctrine . . . the government
characterizes messages advanced under the auspices of its financial and other resources as
distinctively its own and not subject to First Amendment review.”).
62. Id. at 1182; see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009)
(“[G]overnment speech . . . is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.”).
Compare Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 219–220 (holding
that Texas license plates are government-speech and that the DMV lawfully refused approval of
a Confederate license plate) with id. at 234 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The [DMV] rejected the plate
design because it concluded that many Texans would find the flag symbol offensive. That was
pure viewpoint discrimination.”).
63. 555 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2009).
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monument in a public park where the City had previously allowed the
permanent display of other monuments donated by private parties.64
The Court explained the sharp dichotomy between the government
regulating private speech and speaking for itself. If the course of
conduct falls into the latter category, the “Free Speech Clause has no
application.”65 The government-speech doctrine is equally applicable
whether the government authors the expression itself or promotes
private speech to deliver a government approved message.66
The Court supplied three principal reasons why the City’s denial of
the applicant’s monument was government-speech and therefore
unrestricted by the Free Speech Clause. First, the Court looked to the
history of the relevant medium—whether it had long been used to
convey government messages.67 Second, the Court examined whether
reasonable observers would attribute the message to the government.68
Third, the Court considered the level of control exercised by the
government over the medium.69 Weighing the factors, the Court found
it “clear” that the monuments in the public park represented
government-speech.70
2. Two Recent Examples
The Court encountered the government-speech doctrine in two
recent cases in the 2010s, reaching opposite conclusions in each. First,
the Court found government-speech in Walker v. Sons of Confederate
Veterans,71 which addressed the constitutionality of the Texas DMV’s
denial of a specialty license plate designed by the Sons of Confederate
Veterans.72 The group had proposed a plate featuring the Confederate
battle flag.73 The Court reiterated its Summum three-factor test and
held that under the test, specialty license plates were government-

64. Id. at 464–65.
65. Id. at 467.
66. Id. at 468.
67. Id. at 470.
68. See id. at 471 (“[P]ersons who observe donated monuments routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf.”).
69. Summum, 555 U.S. at 471–72 (“[W]hile government entities regularly accept privately
funded or donated monuments, they have exercised selectivity. . . . Government decisionmakers
select the monuments that portray what they view as appropriate for the place in question, taking
into account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local culture.”).
70. Id. at 472.
71. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200 (2015).
72. Id. at 203.
73. Id.
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speech.74 The Court concluded that license plates have historically
communicated a message from the State,75 Texas license plates are
associated in the public mind with the State as government IDs,76 and
the State maintained direct control over the license plates.77
The Court reached the opposite conclusion on government-speech
and signaled a retreat from the doctrine just two years later in Matal v.
Tam. The Court cautioned against expansion of the government-speech
doctrine, noting that “it is susceptible to dangerous misuse.”78 The
government should not be able to pass off private speech as
government-speech with a mere “seal of approval” and thereby silence
objectionable viewpoints.79 The Court therefore rejected the argument
that federally registered trademarks are government-speech.80
Significant factors for the Court were the lack of discretionary approval
on the PTO’s part and the sheer diversity and inconsistency in the
messaging of approved marks. The Court explained, “If the federal
registration of a trademark makes the mark government speech, the
Federal Government is babbling prodigiously and incoherently.”81 The
Court warned that Walker “likely marks the outer bounds of the
government-speech doctrine.”82
III. FIRST CIRCUIT HOLDING
The First Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that
Shurtleff’s Free Speech Clause claims were foreclosed by the
government-speech doctrine.83 Citing Walker and Summum, the court
noted that “[e]ven though the First Amendment restricts government
regulation of private speech in government-designated public forums,
such restrictions do not apply to government speech.”84 The court then
applied the Summum/Walker three-factor test to the specific issue of

74. See id. at 209–10 (summarizing Summum’s three factors and stating, “Our analysis in
Summum leads us to the conclusion that here, too, government speech is at issue.”).
75. Id. at 210–11.
76. Id. at 212.
77. Walker, 576 U.S. at 213.
78. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id; see also id. n.9 (comparing contradictory registered trademarks criticizing abortion
and supporting Planned Parenthood; criticizing and supporting Capitalism; criticizing and
supporting Global Warming).
82. Id. at 1760.
83. Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 986 F.3d 78, 86 (1st. Cir. 2021).
84. Id. at 86 (italics removed).
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flag-raising outside Boston City Hall.85
Turning to the first factor, “the historical use of flags by the
government,”86 the court declared that “governments have used flags
throughout history to communicate messages and ideas.”87 The court
noted that flags have the capacity to communicate messages about a
government’s values, and that a “government flies a flag as a ‘symbolic
act’ and signal of a greater message to the public.”88
The court then turned to the second factor, “the issue of whether
an observer would attribute the message of a third-party flag on the
City’s third flagpole to the City.”89 The Court determined that a person
observing the private third-party flag juxtaposed with the United States
and Massachusetts flags would likely attribute the message to the
government.90
The court finally addressed the third factor, “whether the City
maintains control over the messages conveyed by the third-party
flags.”91 The court placed significance on the application procedure and
its express requirement of city permission, noting the City’s awareness
of the flags flown at City Hall and the City’s requirement that such
third-party flags promote approvable messages.92 The court framed
Boston’s control over its City Hall flagpoles as complete and
conclusive: “[The City’s] final approval authority means that when a
third-party flag flies over City Hall, it flies only because the City chose
to fly it.”93 Shurtleff attempted to discount the level of control actually
exercised by the City, which had approved 284 flags consecutively with
85. See id. at 87–90 (summarizing the issues and factors in Summum and Walker and
applying them to flag-raising on city owned property.)
86. Id. at 88. See also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009) (noting that
public monuments have been used to convey government messages since ancient times); Walker
v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 210–11 (2015) (“[T]he history of
license plates shows that, insofar as license plates have conveyed more than state names and
vehicle identification numbers, they long have communicated messages from the States.”).
87. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 88.
88. Id. (quoting Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 928 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir. 2019)).
89. Id. at 88. See also Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 (determining that reasonable observers
would attribute the message conveyed by a monument on public property to the government);
Walker, 576 U.S. at 212 (noting that Texas license plates are attributed in the public mind to the
government as “essentially, government IDs.”).
90. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 88.
91. Id. at 90. See also Summum, 555 U.S. at 471 (noting that governments exercise
“selectivity” in which privately-donated monuments they choose to allow in public places);
Walker, 576 at 213 (“Third, Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its
specialty license plates.”).
92. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 90.
93. Id. at 91.
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no denials.94 But the court rejected the argument, noting that all 284
flags had been “secular,” and the number of flags approved did not
suffice to show universal access.95
The court ultimately held that each of the three Summum/Walker
factors favored the determination that Boston engages in governmentspeech when it elevates third-party flags outside City Hall.96 The court
also rejected the argument that Boston had created a public forum by
referring to the flagpole and the surrounding area as “public forums,”97
noting that the “conclusion that the City has designated the flagpole as
a public forum ‘is precluded by our government-speech finding.’”98
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court should use Shurtleff as an opportunity to clarify the role
of government intent in the interplay between the government-speech
doctrine and forum analysis. Under the current doctrine, the label
“government-speech” is significant. The government is free from even
the most limited constitutional review when it engages in governmentspeech and can simply “say what it wishes.”99 Nonetheless, the
government generally may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint
in any forum for private speech.
Doctrinally, government-speech and public forum analysis are
logically divorced. If the question “is this government-speech?” can be
answered affirmatively, a court need not even proceed to forum
analysis.100 Nevertheless, sensing the intuitive relationship between the
two doctrines—both of which invoke the Free Speech Clause—courts
facing a challenge to a forum restriction and a government-speech
defense have been compelled to answer both inquiries in a logically
consistent manner.101 Current doctrine can be summarized in the
94. Id.
95. Id. at 92.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 93 (quoting Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 928 F.3d 166, 175 (1st Cir.
2019)).
99. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
100. See, e.g., Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 93 (quoting Shurtleff, 928 F.3d at 175) (“[A] conclusion
that the City has designated the flagpole as a public forum is ‘precluded by our governmentspeech finding.’”).
101. Compare Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009) (“In this case, it is
clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park represent government speech”), with
id. at 473 (“[Pleasant Grove City] does not claim that [it] ever opened up the Park for the
placement of whatever permanent monuments might be offered.”). Compare Walker v. Tex. Div.,
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 208 (2015) (“In our view, specialty license plates
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following chart:102

A court facing a government-speech defense to an alleged Free
Speech violation can begin by applying the Summum/Walker
government-speech factors: the history of the medium, the level of
speech attributed to the government, and the level of control exercised
by the government.103 If the factors are satisfied, the court may label it
“government-speech” and conclude the analysis. But if the
government-speech factors are not satisfied, the court may then
proceed to forum analysis, considering, among other things, whether
the government intended to create a public forum.

issued to Texas’s statutory scheme convey government speech.”), with id. at 216 (“Texas’s policies
and the nature of its license plates indicate that the State did not intend its specialty license plates
to serve as either a designated public forum or a limited public forum.”).
102. See generally Part II, supra (explaining the relationship between the government-speech
and public forum doctrines). “The Shurtleff Conundrum” referenced in the chart is not addressed
explicitly in the doctrinal cases, but is the challenge posed in Shurtleff: resolving the situation that
blurs the line between two purportedly non-overlapping doctrines.
103. See generally Part II-B, supra (explaining the three-factor test and its application in
Summum and Walker).
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A significant conundrum, however, arises in cases where speech
arguably passes the government-speech test but there is ample
evidence that the government intended to create a public forum.
Logically, government-speech and a public forum for private speech
cannot coexist. Therefore, a court facing this conundrum must decide
between the absolute extremes of Free Speech Clause scrutiny:
“government-speech,” which is afforded no Free Speech Clause
scrutiny,104 and “public forum,” which is afforded the highest degree of
Free Speech Clause scrutiny.105 A court cannot even choose the happy
medium of limited public forum analysis, which preserves the right of
the speaker to be free from viewpoint discrimination but allows the
government to regulate content in a reasonable manner.106
Part of the conundrum can be explained by the lack of clarity
regarding what the government-speech question is really asking. For
some Justices, the government-speech test focuses primarily on
whether the public reasonably understands that the government is
expressing itself.107 The facts of Shurtleff present a compelling case for
government-speech under this view, which places heavy weight on the
degree of attribution to the government by an observer. The First
Circuit described how an observer would perceive Boston’s hoisting of
a third-party flag in front of City Hall.108 The observer would arrive at
the City’s seat of government, observe government employees
replacing the Boston flag with the third-party’s flag, and watch as the

104. Summum, 555 U.S. at 464.
105. See Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(explaining that even in the designated public forum, “a content-based prohibition must be
narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”).
106. See id. at 46 (explaining the low standard in limited public forum scrutiny). This “happy
medium” choice is unavailable because the finding of intentional designation as a public forum
shifts the analysis from the more lenient standards applicable in limited public forums to the
stringent standards in designated public forums, which are afforded the same, highest scrutiny as
traditional public forums, so long as the government holds the medium open to the public. Supra,
note 38.
107. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 221–22 (2015)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“Here is a test. Suppose you sat by the side of a Texas highway and studied
the license plates on the vehicles passing by . . . . [W]ould you really think that sentiments
reflected in these specialty license plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the
owners of the cars?”); Id. at 229 (describing the first Summum prong reasoning: “Governments
have always used public monuments to express a government message, and members of the public
understand this.”) (emphasis added); Summum, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“To avoid relying on a per se rule to say when speech is governmental, the best
approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonably and fully informed observer would
understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the
government chooses to oblige. . . .”).
108. Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 986 F.3d 78, 89 (1st. Cir. 2021).
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organization’s flag is hoisted over eighty feet up the flagpole to join the
United States and Massachusetts flags—two clear symbols of
government power.109 In the First Circuit’s view, a reasonable observer
could not be expected to “partition such a coordinated three-flag
display . . . into a series of separate yet simultaneous messages (two
that the government endorses and another as to which the government
disclaims any relation).”110
Despite the flagpole arguably constituting government-speech, a
compelling case can be made that Boston intentionally designated its
flagpole as a public forum. The City explicitly represented the flagpole
and other public spaces as such on its application form,111 and its 284
consecutive approvals of flag-raisings provides substantial evidence
that the act of approving is “merely ministerial.”112 A court facing this
conundrum is currently without explicit Supreme Court guidance on
how to resolve the Free Speech Clause conflict.
The Court can resolve this conundrum by explicitly adding a fourth
factor to the Summum/Walker test for government-speech: “Does the
government intend to speak for itself?” Asking both whether the
government intends to speak for itself and whether citizens understand
the government to be speaking for itself would narrow the instances in
which a government entity may claim the government-speech defense.
Such a proposal is modest, as it merely makes explicit what is
implicit in the caselaw. For example, the Walker Court implicitly
merged government intent and observer attribution in its governmentspeech analysis, stating “Texas explicitly associates itself with the
speech on its plates,”113 and “Texas’s specialty license plate designs ‘are
meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government
message.’”114 The Summum Court noted how the City selected
monuments “for the purpose of presenting the image of the City that
it wishes to project”115 and that there was “little chance that observers
[would] fail to appreciate the identity of the speaker.”116 Under the
proposed four-factor test, a government therefore must be willing to

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 89.
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 7.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985).
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 216 (2015).
Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)).
Summum, 555 U.S. at 473.
Id. at 471.
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take ownership of and endorse the message being conveyed to claim
the government-speech defense.
Adding this fourth factor is also consistent with the Court’s recent
signaling that it may rein in the government-speech doctrine. The
Matal Court warned that surpassing the “outer bounds of the
government-speech doctrine” would permit the government to silence
disfavored viewpoints.117 For a government entity to suppress
viewpoints, both parties must understand that the government is
speaking. And to stay within the “outer bounds” of governmentspeech, the citizen should prevail in cases where government intent is
not sufficiently clear.
The City of Boston would fail the four-part government-speech
test because it has not sufficiently demonstrated that it intends to speak
for itself through the flying of flags outside of City Hall. Where a
government entity does not make this explicit showing, it must be
restricted to the public forum doctrine, and here, the City has run afoul
of those forum protections by discriminating against those wishing to
use the third flagpole to express a religious viewpoint.118
V. ORAL ARGUMENT
The Court began oral arguments by calling attention to the stakes
of the case. Justices Kagan and Kavanaugh asked Petitioner Shurtleff
whether a city would be compelled to fly a Nazi, KKK, or Al-Qaeda
flag.119 Petitioner Shurtleff’s counsel explained that cities can avert
these dilemmas by making a clearer showing of intent to speak for
themselves by maintaining “very specific control of the subject matters
and messages” and being “very clear that it is their speech.”120
Justices Breyer and Kagan inquired about a lay observer’s
perception of the three-flagpole arrangement, asking Petitioner’s

117. Id. at 1758–60.
118. Although it may be argued that no viewpoint discrimination exists where the
government bans all religious flags, irrespective of the speaker’s views regarding such flags, the
Court has framed viewpoint discrimination more broadly, disfavoring this type of analysis. See
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831–32 (1995) (explaining that
the University of Virginia’s ban on funding to all religious student groups is still viewpoint
discriminatory: “It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on
the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another . . . viewpoint. The . . . declaration that
debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed
in multiple ways.”).
119. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Shurtleff v. City of Bos. (U.S. argued Jan. 18, 2021)
(No. 20-1800).
120. Id. at 12.
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counsel how any observer could not attribute the speech to the City.121
Justice Kagan noted that an observer would have to be “very, very
informed” to attribute the third flag to a private party.122 Justice
Sotomayor hinted that the Petitioner might not even be that informed,
as he had on one occasion complained about the City’s flying of the
Chinese flag, implying that he attributed the flag’s message to the
government.123
Justice Kagan’s line of questioning alluded to an issue related to
the Shurtleff conundrum. Kagan inquired how the Court should view
situations where an observer attributes the speech to the government,
but the government showed little intent to control the forum.124 Later,
Justice Kagan noted that “if you look at the lack of control over this
flagpole, it’s hard not to think of it as a public forum.”125 Kagan’s
comments display the kind of reasoning judges must undertake in
resolving the government-speech and public forum doctrines. In her
view, where the government exercises “merely ministerial”126 approval
over private messages—a factor tending to show that the government
has in fact intended to designate a public forum—this necessarily
implies that the government does not control the forum, a factor
weighing against government-speech.127 However, the finding of
“merely ministerial” review (and therefore lack of control) does not
provide a satisfying answer to the government-speech question where
the factor of observer-attribution weighs heavily, as it does in Shurtleff.
During Respondent Boston’s time, Justice Alito asked how much
weight the observer’s perceptions should be given in a governmentspeech finding and whether the flag’s placement in front of City Hall
was dispositive.128 Counsel for Respondent replied that it is “almost
dispositive . . . because I do think that all observers would understand
that that is the City speaking.”129 Justice Alito later hinted that the
121. Id. at 15, 17.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id. at 20–21.
124. Id. at 29.
125. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 80.
126. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 804 (1985).
127. Justice Kagan had previously stipulated, for the sake of argument, “that there was
essentially no control” of the flagpole, after counsel for the United States (as amicus curiae,
supporting reversal) had highlighted the fact that Boston approved flag-raising applications in an
“almost ministerial manner,” an apparent reference to the designated public forum factor noted
in Cornelius. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 28–29.
128. Id. at 59. Justice Breyer’s inquiry was in response to Respondent’s counsel arguing that
“everyone would think [a flag flown on the City Hall flagpole] is the government speaking.”
129. Id.
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government’s intent to endorse its messaging is relevant to finding
government-speech, stating he “doubt[ed] the City really wants to align
itself with every national flag [community members] want to fly.”130
Counsel for Respondent clarified that by flying national flags, the City
was not endorsing the various countries but rather celebrating the
diverse Bostonian community, including members from those
nations.131
The lines of questioning from Justices Kagan and Alito frame the
concerns upon which the Court may fashion its ruling. For these
Justices, observer attribution and government intent might be in
contradiction with each other. In particular, the discussion between
Alito and Respondent over the meaning the government attributes to
the flag-raisings highlights that when it is not even clear what the
government is saying, it is an even farther stretch to assert that the
government is speaking for itself.132
CONCLUSION
The conundrum in government-speech and public forum analysis
places the citizen in a Catch-22 in relation to his government. On the
one hand, where private citizens take issue with the actual speech being
expressed in government-created mediums, the government may
shield itself from accountability and criticism by claiming the speech at
issue is merely a private individual expressing himself in a forum. On
the other hand, when government entities want to discriminate against
private speech, the government may defend on the grounds that since
the government is speaking, it may discriminate for any or no reason
at all. Consequently, the law is unsatisfyingly blurry for courts
attempting to distinguish the doctrines and unsatisfyingly permissive to
the government for those concerned with free expression and
government accountability.
The Court should resolve the conundrum between governmentspeech and forum analysis by explicitly requiring the government to
intend to speak for itself to claim the protection of the governmentspeech doctrine. Cases like Shurtleff and other Free Speech Clause
conundrums will doubtlessly arise in the future, so the Court should

130. Id. at 72.
131. Id. at 72–73.
132. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017) (noting that government-speech
would be “far-fetched” in a situation where the government is “babbling prodigiously and
incoherently.”)
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take advantage of the opportunity to add needed clarity and
predictability to the doctrine. The Court must make clear what
questions the government-speech test should really be asking rather
than continuing to employ the current “jurisprudence of labels.”133 In
doing so, Free Speech Clause doctrine can garner a degree of
predictability, and the rights guaranteed by that Clause can gain more
protection.

133. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 483 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring).

